Icons and abduction by Merell, Floyd & Queiroz, João
 
Signs vol. 4: pp.162 -178, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  162 
Floyd Merrell & João Queiroz 
 
Icons and abduction 
 
I see an azalea in full bloom. No, no! I do not 
see that; though that is the only way I can 
describe what I see. That is a proposition, a 
sentence, a fact; but what I perceive is not 
proposition, sentence, fact, but only an 
image, which I make intelligible in part by 
means of a statement of fact. The 
statement is abstract; but what I see is 
concrete. I perform an abduction when I so 
much as express in a sentence anything I 
see. C.S.Peirce (MS 692) 
 
Abstract:  
In our effort to relate abductive process to iconic semiosis, we argue that meaning 
begins the process of its development as an icon, and logic of abduction is the logic 
responsible for this iconic process. Our aim here is to explore the relationship 
between Peirce’s notion of abductive inference and iconic semiosis.  In order 
properly to develop our argument, it behooves us to offer a brief introduction that 
includes:  (i) the basic characteristics of abduction, (ii) Peirce’s concept of semiosis, 
(iii) Peirce’s categories of mind, and signs processes, and (iv) the nature of the 
iconic sign. 
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Introduction 
One of the most important facets of Peirce’s thought is his effort to develop a logic 
of discovery based on the concept of abductive inference.1 When approached, 
abduction is usually placed within the context of logic- and science-specific 
deductive-inductive concerns, with hardly more than passing mention of meaning, 
                                                     
1
 For an early study, Fann (1970); for further development of the topic, Ayim (1979), Hanson (1961, 
1965), Harris and Hoover (1983), Hintikka (1998), Hoffman (1999), Magnani (2005), Pape (1999), 
Queiroz & Merrell (2005), Staat (1993), Turrisi (1990), Wirth (1999). 
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and creativity.2 But what is the relationship between semiosis (meaning process) 
and abductive inference? What is the relationship between iconic semiotic process 
and abductive inference? According to Peirce, those processes (semiosis and 
abduction) are strongly connected.3  Bearing this in mind, we present a concept of 
abduction that includes inferential processes developing out of the most basic, and 
iconic semiotic forms. We are aware of no systematic study along these lines. This 
might come as a surprise, since Peirce repeated time and again in his writings that 
symbolic signs and their meaning owe their breadth and depth to their having been 
able to stand on the robust shoulders of iconic signs. 
 
Abductive inference 
Abduction is a distinct form of logical inference, though in extreme cases it can be 
and is often confused with perceptual judgment. Peirce defines abduction as “the 
process of forming explanatory hypotheses” (CP 5.171),4 the “only kind of argument 
which starts a new idea” (CP 2.96). It consists in two operations: the selection and 
formation of hypotheses for the purpose of further consideration (CP 6.525). As an 
“act of insight” that “comes to us like a flash” (CP 5.181), abduction is germane to 
creative and aesthetic dimensions of human cognition in addition to the importance 
of abductive inference in the formal disciplines. For Peirce, abduction is also the 
logical inference by which new knowledge can be obtained: “Abduction consists in 
studying the facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that 
if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way” (CP 5.145); “It must 
be remembered that abduction, although it is little hampered by logical rules, 
                                                     
2
 This assertion virtually applies to all the entries in note 1; some obvious exceptions are found in 
Queiroz and Merrell (2005). 
3
 Engel-Tiercelin (1992, 1998), Hartshorne (1970), Hausman (1993), Hookway (2002), Merrell (2000), 
Neumann (2003), Rosenthal (1994, 2000). 
4
 We shall follow the practice of citing from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, 
1931-35, 1958) by volume number and paragraph number, preceded by ‘CP’; the Essential Peirce by 
volume number and page number, preceded by ‘EP’.  References to the microfilm edition of Peirce's 
papers (Harvard University) will be indicated by ‘MS’, followed by the manuscript number. 
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nevertheless is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or 
conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly definite logical form” 
(Peirce 1901: 15; CP 5.188). 
In our effort to relate abductive process to iconic semiosis, we argue that 
meaning begins the process of its development as an icon, and logic of abduction is 
the logic responsible for iconic processes (Hookway 2002, Merrell 2004, 2005). Our 
aim here is to elucidate the relationship between Peirce’s notion of abductive 
inference and iconic semiosis. In order properly to develop our argument, it 
behooves us to offer a brief introduction that includes: (i) the basic characteristics of 
abduction, (ii) Peirce’s concept of semiosis, (iii) Peirce’s categories of mind, signs, 
and nature’s processes, and (iv) the nature of the iconic sign. The reader should bear 
in mind that our argument borders on recent developments in cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence. 
 
What must be the nature abductive inference? 
Is abduction no more than vague, conjectural, tentative, merely a radically 
indeterminate might be in contrast to what is and what must necessarily be? If so, 
can we validly speak of abductive reasoning? Of abductive inference? Peirce 
responds in the affirmative. He tells us that pragmatism “is nothing else than the 
question of the logic of abduction” (CP 5.196). Even though abduction is an “act of 
insight” that suddenly appears from somewhere (CP 5.181), and even though it is 
creative, of aesthetic nature, it is both inferential and insightful, both reasoning and 
creative, both rigorous and a free flight of the imagination (Anderson 1986, 1958). 
What kind of logic can this be?  If it is any kind of logic at all, by Peirce’s own 
admission it is at one and the same time both logical in the classical binary sense and 
psychological, hence caught up in ambiguity (CP 2.107).  The riddle of abductive 
logic, if such logic there be, must include vagueness and inconsistency and generality 
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and incompleteness.5 Given the nature of vagueness, both one possibility and the 
other can be acceptable, given different timespace conditions. Given the nature of 
generality, neither one contextualized assertion nor another one is acceptable, for 
there is at minimum a third possibility. With this in mind, we can hardly escape the 
premonition that abductive inference by means of abductive logic takes in alogical 
principles from the viewpoint of classical logic, and it allows for the possibility of 




Peirce’s categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) are logically conceived as a 
system of irreducible classes of relations (monadic, dyadic, triadic). This system is 
the foundation of his philosophy and of his model of semiosis (see Murphey 1993: 
303-306). Ontologically the categories are rudiments of the world. Firstness is the 
mode of being in which something is as it positively is, with no regard to anything 
else (MS 460: 5-21, 1903; MS 575,1886; W 5.299). It can be characterized as lacking 
determination: it is what it is without regard or relation to anything else (cf. also MS 
277,1908). Therefore, Firstness as a mode of being is related to the modality of 
possibility. Secondness is the mode of being that is what it is with respect to some 
Second, irrespective of any Third. It is a kind of reaction with some other (CP 6.200). 
Like Firstness, Secondness can be related to a modality, namely the modality of 
actuality (Parker 1998; CP 6.455). The actuality of a thing is simply its occurrence: 
“Actuality is the Act which determines the merely possible. It is the act of direct 
determination. [It is the act] of arbitrary determination” (Peirce MS 277, 1908, 
p.00062). Rephrased, actuality is the realization of a possibility, without thereby 
                                                     
5
 For some possible suggestions and sources, see Brock (1979), Chiasson (2002), Costa (1974), Costa 
and Krause (2001, 2003), Costa and Bueno (2001), Daniel (2003), Engel-Tiercelin (1992), Hanson 
(1961, 1965), Merrell (1997), Nadin (1983), Priest (1987, 2004, 2006), Priest et al., eds. (1989), 
Rescher and Brandom (1979). 
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having reference to something larger, be that a general law or an interpretation. 
Thirdness is the category of mediation: Thirdness mediates and thereby interrelates 
Firstness and Secondness in the same way that it mediates and brings itself into 
interrelation with them. The example par excellence is Peirce’s semiotic process, in 
which a sign is related to an object by mediation through an interpretant. 
 
Semiosis and icon, the sign of Firstness 
According to Peirce, any description of semiosis (action of sign) involves a relation 
constituted by three irreducibly connected terms: 
 
My definition of a sign is: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so 
determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself, called 
its Object, while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential 
Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, 
that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined immediately by the Object 
(CP 8.177. Emphasis in the original). 
 
The above triadic relation is regarded by Peirce as irreducible in the sense that it is 
not decomposable into any simpler relation or set of relations. He conceived a Sign 
as a “First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 
Object, so as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume 
the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object” 
(CP 2.274. See also CP 2.303, 2.92, 1.541). The triadic relation between sign, object, 
and interpretant is irreducible: it cannot be decomposed into any simpler relation. 
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A sign is also pragmatically defined as a medium for the communication to the 
interpretant of a form embodied in the object, so as to constrain, in general, the 
interpreter’s behavior. 
 
[…] a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. [...]. 
As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which 
determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. [...]. That which is 
communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form; 
that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that 
something would happen under certain conditions (Peirce MS 793:1-3. See EP 
2.544, n.22, for a slightly different version). 
 
The object of sign transmission is a habit (a regularity, or a pattern of constraints) 
embodied as a constraining factor of interpretative behavior – a logically would be 
fact of response. The form is something that is embodied in the object as a 
regularity, a habit, a rule of action, or a disposition. Form is defined as having the 
being of predicate (EP 2.544) and it is also pragmatically formulated as a conditional 
proposition stating that certain things would happen under specific circumstances 
(EP 2.388). For Peirce, it is nothing like a thing (De Tienne 2003), but something that 
is embodied in the object (EP 2.544, n. 22) as a habit, a rule of action (CP 5.397, CP 
2.643), a disposition (CP 5.495, CP 2.170), a real potential (EP 2.388) or, simply, a 
permanence of some relation (CP 1.415). We can say that Peirce follows a via media 
in which form has both the character of Firstness and Thirdness.  
In the context of the most fundamental division of signs (CP 2.275), the 
categories correspond to icons (Firstness), indexes (Secondness), and symbols 
(Thirdness), which, in turn, match relations of similarity, contiguity, and law between 
S and O (sign-object relation) in the triad S-O-I (S-O relations coming into relation 
with an interpretant). Icons are signs that stand for their objects through similarity 
 
Signs vol. 4: pp.162 -178, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  168 
or resemblance, in spite of whether or not they show any spatiotemporal physical 
correlation with an existent object. In this case, a sign refers to an object in virtue of 
a certain quality that sign and object share. When the interpreting system suffers an 
effect of the sign (i.e., when an interpretant takes place within it), this is due to the 
communication of a quality of the object to the system through the sign. An icon can 
refer to an object independently of the spatiotemporal presence of the latter 
because it denotes the object merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it 
possesses, just the same, no matter if the object is present or  not, and, in fact, no 
matter if the object actually exists or not. Icons play a central role in sensory tasks 
since they are associated with the qualities of objects. Thus, they are present in the 
sensorial recognition of external stimuli of any modality, as well as in the cognitive 
relation of analogy. 
In contrast, indices are signs that refer to an object due to a direct physical 
connection between them. Since in this case the sign should be determined by the 
object, for instance, through a causal relationship, both must exist as actual events. 
This is an important feature distinguishing iconic from indexical sign-mediated 
processes. Accordingly, spatio-temporal co-variation is the most characteristic 
property of indexical processes. Symbols are signs that are related to their object 
through a determinative relation of law, rule or convention. A symbol becomes a 
sign of some object merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as 
such, due to some of the kind of relations mentioned above. 
In this iconic sign process, the form which is communicated from the object to 
the interpretant through the sign is a general similarity between the object and the 
sign. Generally speaking, an iconic sign communicates a habit embodied in an object 
to the interpretant, so as to constrain the interpreter’s behavior, as a result of a 
certain quality that the sign and the object share. In this indexical sign process, for 
example, the form which is communicated from the object to the interpretant 
through the sign can be a general physical correlation between measles and the 
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small red spots in the skin. Generally speaking, an indexical sign communicates a 
habit embodied in an object to the interpretant as a result of a direct physical 
connection between sign and object. Finally, in a symbolic relation, the interpretant 
stands for the object through the sign by a determinative relation of law, rule or 
convention (CP 2.276). 
What does it mean to say that the general semiotic process crucially depends 
on iconic processes involved in the development of indexical and symbolic signs? 
Icons are signs essentially hypothetical, deeply dependent on the qualities they 
contain. As we have indicated, form can be defined as potentiality (real potential, EP 
2.388). If we consider this definition, we will also come to the conclusion that form 
can show the nature of both Firstness and Thirdness. Consider that potentiality is 
not the same as mere possibility. For the sake of our arguments, consider Peirce’s 
treatment of Quality as a mere abstract potentiality (CP 1.422). It is abstraction not 
in the sense of a reduction of complexity to formal simplicity, but in the sense that 
the quality in question has been abstracted (cut) from the continuum of possibilities. 
 
On Peirce’s possibility 
Peirce at times refers to Thirdness as possibility. In fact, Rosenthal observes that 
“Peirce’s dual use of the term “possibility” is quite understandable, for since 
Secondness comprises the domain of the actual, the possible, in a broad sense, must 
inhere in both Firstness and Thirdness” (2001, p. 4). However, Firstness involves a 
weaker type of possibility than does Thirdness. To distinguish the possibility involved 
in each of the two categories, Peirce most often adopts possibility as qualification of 
Firstness and potentiality as qualification of Thirdness — though he remains 
somewhat ambiguous on the issue, as Rosenthal points out. In this manner, if 
Firstness is pure possibility — what might be — and Secondness is what is, in the 
physical world or the world of mind, then Thirdness is what should be. Firstness, 
then precedes what is though without its presenting a vague range of possibilities 
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what is could not have been, what is is to a greater or lesser degree what should 
have been. Secondness involves particulars, prior to their collection into generalities. 
And Thirdness is the collection of particulars into generalities. 
The important point is that since Firstness implies any and all possibilities, 
some of them must contradict one another: they are inconsistent. Generals as 
Thirdness were always there as possibilities of Firstness. As possibilities, generals at 
one time and place and within one culture might be considered real, but at another 
time and place within another culture those same generals might be considered 
mere figments of the imagination. This is to say that any and all generals are to a 
greater or lesser extent incomplete, since there is the possibility that at some space-
time juncture they may be discarded and replaced by some alternative or other. In 
other words, no actual collection of objects, acts, and events in the practices and 
knowledge of everyday life can completely exhaust the range of possible actualities 
held within the embrace of Firstness, there and ready for the taking by some 
interpreting agent or other. 
Or in Nelson Goodman’s (1978) manner of putting the issue, there can be 
many possible worlds or collections of particulars and their respective generalities, 
some of them compatible with one another, some of them in competition, and 
some of them mutually contradictory, but no matter how many worlds have been 
constructed and concocted, their sum will never be tantamount to The World (the 
collection of all possibilities of Firstness). Firstness, then, embraces all possibilities of 
generality. 
In sum, quality is of the nature of Firstness, being essentially indeterminate 
and vague. In a certain sense Thirdness entails quality generalized. But in this case, 
we are beyond the domain of pure Firstness, as generality refers to convention or 
some law-like tendency. When addressing ourselves to semiosis in terms of iconic 
signs of Firstness and abduction, we must focus on possibility.   
 
Signs vol. 4: pp.162 -178, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  171 
 
Where to begin where there is not really any where or when? 
Ideally, abduction should complement the chiefly voluntary manipulation of signs in 
inductive and deductive practices. The process of hypothesis formation is put into 
play by an individual act of abduction. Peirce considered “one of the worst of ... 
confusions, as well as one of the commonest” that of “regarding abduction and 
induction taken together ... as a simple argument” (CP 7.218). 
Nevertheless, confusion of abduction and induction has been common. For 
example, Nelson Goodman, like the vast majority of scholars during the heyday of 
logical positivism and since, has essentially ignored abduction. This is especially 
evident in his New Riddle of Induction.6 The riddle is a play on two conflicting color 
concepts. We believe the assertion Emeralds are green was, is, and will always be 
true, for emeralds can be none other than green, and that’s that.  However, some 
people from an exotic culture who take it that ‘Emeralds are “grue”’, which should 
be fine by us. But it isn’t. Their grue emeralds are the equivalent of our green 
emeralds before time t0, but thereafter grue for them is the same as what for us is 
blue (their bleen). Strange indeed, we are inclined to conclude. But from their 
vantage it is we who are misled by our appearances. Our green emeralds are their 
grue emeralds up to and including time t0, but thereafter our green is what for them 
is bleen (our blue).  Color schemes regarding our green-blue and their grue-bleen are 
symmetrical. As far as they are concerned, we have no more inductive certainty than 
do they from our perspective. 
James Harris (1992, pp. 60-61) writes, and justifiably so, that if we adopt 
Peirce’s distinction between abduction and induction, then [Goodman’s] new riddle 
of induction is properly viewed as a riddle of abduction. Hume’s dilemma was how to 
explain how what we have seen in the past can justify predictions regarding what we 
will see in the future. Goodman’s riddle rests on how hypotheses are chosen for 
                                                     
6
 See Goodman 1965, Hacking 1993, 1997, Hesse 1969, and especially Stalker, 1994. 
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confirmation in the first place: within a given cultural context will the consensus be 
All emeralds are green or All emeralds are grue, and why?  Properly separating 
Goodman from Hume, and roughly we have Peirce’s abduction-induction pair. 
Once selection of a sign has been made from the range of all possibilities, the 
fee has been paid for entering the field of underdetermined concepts and theories, 
that, since they are never absolute nor complete, eventually they will suffer 
alterations, or they will be discarded entirely. But we must be more specific 
regarding abductive inference. So, consider this: What color are emeralds? Why 
green of course. One day we make the acquaintance of a strange soul for whom 
emeralds used to be grue (our green) and at a certain point in time he still called 
them grue but in a different way (corresponding to our blue).  
 
Abductive uncertainties 
Abduction, icons, and Firstness have to do largely with similarities. Goodman claims 
similarities are inevitably wrong from one perspective or another, for they could 
have always been other than what they are. Peirce also recognized that: 
 
There is no greater nor more frequent mistake in practical logic than to 
suppose that things which resemble one another strongly in some respects are 
any the more likely for that to be alike in others....  The truth is, that any two 
things resemble one another just as strongly as any two others, if recondite 
resemblances are admitted. (CP 2.634) 
 
The ultimate implications of Peirce’s practical logic of abductive inference are no 
less radical than Goodman’s comparable notion of similarity. If virtually any and all 
resemblances, even the most blatant and the most recondite, stand a gaming 
chance of gaining entrance into the semiotic world from a virtually aleatory 
background of possibilities, then there is no all-or-nothing method for determining 
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beforehand whether All emeralds are green or All emeralds are grue — or any other 
combination of likely candidates — will withstand the test of time.   
 
Is the idea of abductive meaning meaningful? 
Ian Hacking (1993) gives account of Kripke’s (1982) correlating Goodman with 
Wittgenstein’s skeptical problem. Kripke suggests that grue can be addressed not to 
induction but most properly to meaning. The question would not be Why not predict 
that grass, which has been grue in the past, will be grue in the future? but rather, the 
Wittgensteinian question Who is to say that in the past I did not mean grue by 
“green,” so that now I should call the sky, not the grass, “green”? (Kripke l982, p. 
58). In other words, in the past I called emeralds green, but meant grue, and now I 
continue to call them green, but I actually mean bleen (in English, blue). And I now 
call the sky blue, but actually mean green (that is, grue). Hacking points out that 
while Goodman’s problem is outer directed with respect to what the community 
thinks and says, Kripke’s is inner directed:  what I think and say. 
In this sense, his question becomes:  Why do I call the sky blue and grass green 
when actually I mean green (grue) and blue (bleen) respectively? If we take 
Goodman’s original use of his riddle into full account, as does Hacking, then the 
entire community comes into the picture. We, as members of the community, could 
all be speaking out of the wrong side of our mouth for the sake of maintaining lines 
of communication intact without knowing that everyone else was doing the same. 
Ultimately, the problem with meaning is not in its proof but in its taste. Quite 
simply, if it goes untasted, virtually anything may be capable of going as a proof, and 
if virtually anything can be a proof, then whatever the taste may prove, the proof 
will more often than not be little more than superfluous. We allude to the 
inextricability, in good semiotic practices, of either the representamen, the semiotic 
object, or the interpretant of the sign, and of either Firstness, Secondness, or 
Thirdness, from the entire triad of interrelations. The thorn in the side of meaning is 
 
Signs vol. 4: pp.162 -178, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  174 
that most popular accounts of the grue-green dilemma highlight either one or two 
legs of the triad at the expense of the other(s).  On the one hand, Goodman’s riddle 
focuses on projection of predicates on things, thereby bringing about entrenchment, 
which is not a matter of truth or even meaning, per se, but of linguistic practice. On 
the other hand, Kripke’s Goodman raises the question of meaning, if not exactly 
truth, in addition to induction. Goodman, as a good nominalist, evokes an attitude 
focusing more on actuals (Seconds), how they are most appropriately to be taken, 
once seen, and most specifically, how they should be clothed in linguistic garb 
(Thirds). 
Kripke’s Goodman takes actuals in his stride as a matter of course; of more 
focal interest is the range of possibles, and how, in their interaction with those 
actuals, they can in the future potentially give rise to alternatives to the conventions 
that be. That is one difference between Goodman’s true grue and Kripke’s 
Goodman’s grue. Another important difference is that of outer directedness and 
inner directedness. Kripke, following Wittgenstein on rules, remains tied to 
consideration of thought-signs—in contrast to Goodman’s emphasis on sign-
events—of the mathematical sort, which are in this sense quite commensurate with 
Peirce’s consideration of mathematics, fictions, dreams, and hallucination (Dozoretz 
1979). 
Speaking of Peirce, where he stands out most briskly when placed alongside 
the Goodman-Kripke pair rests in his refusal to eschew indexicality, and especially 
iconicity, from the entire picture: he by no means remained inextricably tied to 
language (or symbols) and language alone. Peirce stressed long and hard that there 
is an iconic relation between the semiotic object that gives rise to an abduction and 
its attendant hypothesis, on the one hand, and that semiotic object as it is actually 
perceived inductively, on the other. This relation is that of analogy or resemblance, 
proper to iconicity. In this regard, meaning is impossible without abduction, 
iconicity, and Firstness. 
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